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I. INTRODUCTION:  GROWING STORMS AND GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
Even as the number and effects of major disasters have steadily in-
creased, government has played an increasingly large and central role
in the response and recovery efforts after major disasters.1 Hurricane
Harvey alone caused approximately $125 billion in economic losses.2
The federal government allocated over $136 billion in assistance for
2017 major disasters.3 Without adaptation and mitigation measures,
researchers project that annual economic losses from storm, flood,
and subsidence damage in the world’s coastal cities will average over
$1 trillion per year by 2050.4 Even with adaptation and mitigation,
annual losses in 2050 are still likely to exceed $60 billion per year.5
Between 1970 and 2017, natural disasters accounted for 19 of the
world’s 20 most costly insured catastrophes.6 The exception was the
September 11th attacks, which cost insurers just less than $26 billion—
$4 billion less than Hurricane Harvey ($30 billion) and three times
less than insured losses related to Hurricane Katrina ($82 billion).7
1. See BRUCE R. LINDSAY & FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42702, STAFFORD ACT DECLARATIONS 1953-2014: TRENDS, ANALYSES, AND IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR CONGRESS 15 (2014).
2. Memorandum from Jeff Lindner, Dir. of Hydrologic Operations/Meteorolo-
gist & Steve Fitzgerald, Chief Eng’r, Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., to HCFCD
Flood Watch/Partners 2 (June 4, 2018), https://www.hcfcd.org/media/2678/immediate-
flood-report-final-hurricane-harvey-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5FH-GPGD].
3. WILLIAM L. PAINTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45084, 2017 SUPPLEMENTAL
DISASTER APPROPRIATIONS: OVERVIEW 15 (2018).
4. Borja G. Reguero et al., Comparing the Cost Effectiveness of Nature-Based
and Coastal Adaptation: A Case Study from the Gulf Coast of the United States,
PLOSONE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/jour
nal.pone.0192132&type=printable [https://perma.cc/78R8-G57V].
5. Stephane Hallegatte et al., Future Flood Losses in Major Coastal Cities, 3 NA-
TURE CLIMATE CHANGE 802, 802 (2013).
6. STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/267210/natural-disaster-damage-
totals-worldwide-since-1970/ [https://perma.cc/F982-G53D] (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
7. Id. A substantial part of the large insured losses following Katrina were re-
lated to damage to oil and gas wells and refineries.
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Notably, 15 of the top 20 insured catastrophes occurred, at least in
part, on U.S. territory.8 Even before Hurricane Harvey, Texas led the
nation in the highest number of natural disaster declarations.9
This Article focuses on the role that the U.S., Texas, and local gov-
ernments play, and pay for, in disaster recovery.10 While disaster-
struck communities develop plans for recovery, these communities
rely more and more on federal assistance, even as they navigate a
complex web of federal programs that focus heavily on recovery that
acknowledge adaptation and mitigation but fail to prioritize them.11
II. FRAMEWORKS FOR DISASTER:  THE COMPLICATED ROLE OF
FEDERAL AGENCIES IN LOCAL DISASTER
RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY
A. Changing National Character:  Disaster Recovery
Between 1803 and 1974
The federal government’s role in disaster recovery has undoubtedly
changed over time.12 The federal government entered into disaster re-
covery assistance in 1803 when Congress provided aid to a New
Hampshire town devastated by a large fire.13 The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (the “Corps”) has managed civil works projects of national
importance since 1824.14 The Corps first responded to a federal emer-
8. Id.
9. Faith Barasa, The US States Most Prone to Natural Disasters, WORLD ATLAS
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-states-most-prone-to-natu
ral-disasters.html [https://perma.cc/9445-HDHV].
10. FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33053, FEDERAL STAF-
FORD ACT DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVI-
TIES, AND FUNDING 3 (2011).
11. HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., UNIV. PA., INSURANCE, ECONOMIC INCEN-
TIVES AND OTHER POLICY TOOLS FOR STRENGTHENING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
RESILIENCE: 20 PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 27 (2016), http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/
risk/library/WP2016Dec_CIRI-Phase-I.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NQJ-D3SS]; ANTHONY
TORRES ET AL., LESSONS FROM HURRICANE SANDY: ANALYSIS OF VULNERABILITIES
EXPOSED BY HURRICANE SANDY AND POTENTIAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES IN THE
NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 20 (2015), http://climateknowledge.org/figures/Rood
_Climate_Change_AOSS480_Documents/AOSS480_2015_Sandy_Climate_Case_Stu
dy_Narrative.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH22-YJBF].
12. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster
Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 327 (Kenneth A.
Froot ed., 1999) (providing an informative and highly readable history of disaster
policy).
13. About the Agency, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/about-agency [https://perma
.cc/VKT7-L8X4] (last updated Mar. 26, 2018, 12:51 PM).
14. See MARTIN REUSS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, RESHAPING NA-
TIONAL WATER POLITICS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE WATER RESOURCE DEVELOP-
MENT ACT OF 1986 4 (1991), https://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/docs/iwr
reports/91-PS-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CB5-S9K5]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-10-819, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS: ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGN-
MENT COULD ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS, BUT SEVERAL CHALLENGES WOULD HAVE
TO BE OVERCOME 1 (2010), https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/310469.pdf [https://perma
.cc/29CG-G6PA]; see also DAVID P. BILLINGTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTE-
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gency, and more specifically flood recovery response, just after the
Civil War.15 Between 1803 and 1947, Congress passed approximately
128 ad hoc pieces of legislation, less than one per year, in response to
other natural disasters and did not have any set obligation to assist.16
Generally, states and local governments sought help from national
charities, like the American Red Cross or the Salvation Army, before
and in lieu of assistance from the federal government.17 During severe
droughts in Texas during the mid-1880s, Clara Barton, the founder of
the American Red Cross, visited Texas.18 After consulting Barton in
1887, President Grover Cleveland vetoed Congress’s bill providing
$10,000 in federal assistance to Texas.19 Consistent with the contempo-
rary view of government, President Cleveland reasoned that, “Federal
aid in [cases of misfortune] encourages the expectation of paternal
care on the part of the Government and weakens the sturdiness of our
national character.”20 In 1905, Congress sought to officially limit its
disaster assistance role by appointing the American Red Cross to act
as its official agent in administration of disaster relief but did not pro-
vide funding to the charity.21
In 1917, Congress began to expand its responsibility under the
Commerce Clause by funding improvements, not just for harbors and
rivers, by passing the 1917 Flood Control Act.22 The 1917 Act pro-
vided $45 million for flood control projects, such as levees, along the
Mississippi River.23 The federal government reconsidered its role in
disaster response after the 1927 Mississippi River Floods.24 President
of both the United States and the American Red Cross at the time,
Calvin Coolidge announced that government and private philanthropy
should work together in responding to flooding that displaced 600,000
people along the Mississippi River.25 With Coolidge leading both the
federal and private efforts, the federal government provided approxi-
RIOR, THE HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS: PLANNING, DESIGN, AND CON-
STRUCTION IN THE ERA OF BIG DAMS 15 (2005), https://www.usbr.gov/history/History
ofLargeDams/LargeFederalDams.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ3A-R6D6] (providing a
thorough history of the Corps’ involvement in federal projects).
15. U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, https://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-
History-of-the-Corps/Responding-to-Natural-Disasters/ [https://perma.cc/BF9N-
B8V6] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
16. Moss, supra note 12, at 312; About the Agency, supra note 13.
17. See Moss, supra note 12, at 313.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 312.
20. Id. at 313 (alteration in original) (quoting President Cleveland’s Veto Message
of Feb. 16, 1887).
21. Id. (Calvin Coolidge’s dual presidencies make more sense with the Red
Cross’s official designation).
22. REUSS, supra note 14, at 13.
23. Id.
24. Moss, supra note 12, at 313.
25. Id. at 308.
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mately $10 million (3.3% of total damages) in financial assistance.26
The Red Cross provided $17 million in cash and another $6 million in
in-kind contributions.27 The total assistance to the 1927 storms totaled
about 13% of the $300 million in related damages.28
Further disasters in the 1920s and 1930s, including infrastructure
failures and the Great Depression, accelerated changing attitudes on
the role of government and paved the way for Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
New Deal.29 With the New Deal’s emphasis on public works, Congress
passed an updated  Flood Control Act and officially declared flood
control a federal responsibility in 1936.30 The Corps’ role in emer-
gency response and resiliency dramatically increased after the passage
of the 1936 Flood Control Act.31 The Act also required the Corps to
design projects based on economic analysis such that in order to build
a project, the project’s benefits had to outweigh the project’s costs.32
In 1937, the Corps’ chief of engineers ordered all engineering districts
across the country to develop flood plans.33 In 1938, Congress passed
a second Flood Control Act that financed flood control infrastructure,
including reservoirs, at 100%.34
That same year (a presidential election year), Congress created a
crop insurance program as part of the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment
Act.35 In spite of a recent history of droughts, such as the Texas 1880s
droughts, the private multi-peril crop insurance market was unavaila-
ble in the early twentieth century.36 Because many farmers did not
purchase crop insurance, the farmers willing to pay for coverage could
not find policies.37 After a series of droughts in the 1930s, President
Roosevelt called on Congress to provide individual crop insurance.38
During the Roosevelt Administration, more federal entities gained
the responsibility to assist natural disaster victims, such as the Na-
tional Conservation and Reclamation Service and Federal Works Ad-
ministration.39 Later administrations sought to clarify and build upon
26. Id. at 309.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See BILLINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 389-91.
30. Moss, supra note 12, at 314.
31. Id.
32. NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45185, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS: WATER RESOURCE AUTHORIZATION AND PROJECT DELIVERY
PROCESSES 12 (2018).
33. U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, supra note 15.
34. Moss, supra note 12, at 314.
35. Id. at 320.
36. Id. The private market still provides crop-hail insurance. See Background on:
Crop Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.iii.org/article/back
ground-on-crop-insurance [https://perma.cc/7JBY-LKJ8].
37. Moss, supra note 12, at 320.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 314-15; Jason M. Sugarman, Note, Still Underwater: The Need for Tem-
porary Foreclosure and Mortgage Relief for Victims of Future Natural Disasters, 50
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the New Deal’s basic assumptions on the federal government’s role.
Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which pro-
vided federal assistance for natural disasters only if the following
events occurred: (1) the President provided a disaster declaration in
response to a governor’s request; and (2) the assistance supplemented
state and local relief and recovery efforts.40 The Corps’ reputation for
disaster response led Congress to make it the primary agency in
charge of emergency response under the 1950 Act, but the Red Cross
retained control of the relief distribution.41
Congress subsequently began to provide funding for other types of
assistance, such as debris removal and school repairs, provided
through a variety of different federal agencies.42 Local entities even
received the ability to develop and manage projects and receive fed-
eral funding with oversight from the Corps as part of the 1968
Harbors and Rivers Act.43 After twenty-nine major disasters in 1969,
including Hurricane Camille, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act
of 1970, which provided new types of relief such as individual tempo-
rary housing, small business loans, and hazard mitigation.44
B. Managing Disaster: The Stafford Act & the Federal
Emergency Management Agency
Congress passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5121 (Stafford Act), “to provide
an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Govern-
ment to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibili-
ties to alleviate the suffering and damage [that] result from such
disasters.”45 The Stafford Act retained the two conditions on federal
assistance provided in the 1950 Act and set out to better organize ex-
isting disaster legislation and administration.46
The Stafford Act’s framework allowed state governments to request
assistance from the President after a natural disaster, and then provide
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 583, 585 (2017); A Brief History of NRCS, NAT. RES.
CONSERVATION SERV., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/
about/history/?cid=nrcs143_021392 [https://perma.cc/H4QF-HHZR] (last visited Nov.
11, 2018).
40. Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109, 1109-10
(1950); See U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, supra note 15 (discussing the Corps’ promi-
nent role under the Act).
41. Moss, supra note 12, at 314-15.
42. Id. at 317.
43. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-97, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGI-
NEERS: BETTER GUIDANCE COULD IMPROVE CORPS’ INFORMATION ON WATER RE-
SOURCES PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY NONFEDERAL SPONSORS 14 (2016).
44. Moss, supra note 12, at 317.
45. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5121 et seq., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 173, § 2 (2006).
46. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, at 3.
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federal agencies, like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, with authori-
zation and funding to assist with response, recovery, and long-term
planning.47 Ironically, relief efforts after the Stafford Act were still
initially unwieldy because the President, not an agency, coordinated
the growing number of federal agencies that assisted natural disaster
victims.48
President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order in 1979 that con-
solidated the coordination functions of emergency response agencies
into one entity: the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”).49 Although the executive order overhauled the structure
and operations of the federal government’s disaster relief system, it
did not address the intersections between federal agencies and state
and local governments.50 In 1988, Congress amended the Stafford Act
to grant FEMA the ability and responsibility to coordinate relief ef-
forts across state, local, and federal levels once a state’s governor calls
a state of emergency and writes a formal letter to the President re-
questing relief under the Stafford Act.51
C. Individual Disasters:  Federal Flood and
Crop Insurance Programs
Like the 1930s crop insurance market, the 1960s private flood insur-
ance market was unsuccessful because pricing the risk and retaining
customers in many areas proved wholly unprofitable.52 The National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968 created the National Flood Insurance
Program (“NFIP”) to provide coverage that the private insurance in-
dustry did not effectively offer.53 In NFIP, Congress sought to reduce
individual homeowners’ exposure to the damage of potential flooding
and to deter future development in flood-prone areas by creating
flood maps and pricing policies accordingly.54 Congress also intended
for NFIP to mitigate and reduce flood risk through mitigation
projects.55
During this period, the thirty-year-old federal crop insurance pro-
gram began to falter—primarily because farmers were unwilling to
47. Id. at 1.
48. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 585–86.
49. Exec. Order No. 12,127, 3 C.F.R. p. 376 (Apr. 1, 1979). See also REUSS, supra
note 15, at 48–49 (providing insight into Jimmy Carter’s distrust of the Corps based
on the Corps’ “computational manipulation” and possible deceit in pursuing dam
projects while Carter was Georgia’s Governor).
50. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 585.
51. Id.
52. Moss, supra note 12, at 320.
53. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 592.
54. Alexander S. Mendelson, Note, Taking Away the Tightrope: Fixing the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program Circus Via Eminent Domain, 83 BROOK. L. REV.
1519, 1520 (2018).
55. DIANE P. HORN & JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44593, IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 2 (2018).
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buy policies and relied on disaster assistance instead.56 The Federal
Crop Insurance Act of 1980 attempted to eliminate disaster assistance
payments to farmers and strengthen the market by requiring commer-
cial farmers to purchase crop insurance and to provide subsidies to
private farmers.57 In spite of these subsidies and likely due to ongoing
and generous disaster assistance payments, fewer than 50% of farmers
obtained crop insurance after 1980.58 Congress passed the Federal
Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which restricted disaster assis-
tance and mandated that the program cover 80% of arable land.59 Af-
ter these reforms, the crop insurance program returned to solvency.60
In an attempt to make NFIP as sustainable as crop insurance, Con-
gress required NFIP to collect premiums from policyholders so that
the sum of these premiums would cover losses from natural disas-
ters.61 NFIP implemented a Community Rating System in 1990 to en-
courage participating communities to voluntarily exceed NFIP
minimum standards to reduce premiums.62 Congress passed the Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 1994 to reduce and eliminate repetitive
flood damage and claims.63 The 1994 Act created the Flood Mitigation
Assistance Grant Program, and it prohibited loans for structures in
“high-risk areas” unless the borrower obtained flood insurance.64 In
spite of the additional requirements and mitigation program, annual
payouts routinely exceeded collected premiums.65 One primary rea-
son for these losses in annual payouts was that Congress directed
FEMA to subsidize rates for homes built before flood plain maps—
this date may be as early as December 31, 1974, but varies by commu-
nity.66 In 2006, the Government Accountability Office placed NFIP on
its High-Risk List.67
56. Moss, supra note 12, at 320.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 320; Background on: Crop Insurance, supra note 36 (stating that the
federal crop insurance program currently insures over 80% of arable farm land, meet-
ing statutory requirements).
59. Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-354, 108 Stat. 3178 (1994).
60. See National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.).
61. See Mendelson, supra note 54, at 1521–22.
62. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEM FACT
SHEET (2017), https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/9998 [https://per
ma.cc/UTS4-H44L].
63. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FY 2018 FLOOD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE
(FMA) GRANT PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2018), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1534266359629-01e90efe4f62f4510898f244a5501f41/Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M8BG-MW7M].
64. National Flood Insurance Reform Act §§ 522, 553.
65. See Sugarman, supra note 39, at 593–94.
66. HORN & BROWN, supra note 55, at 15.
67. Mendelson, supra note 54, at 1520.
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In recognition of ongoing problems with NFIP, Congress undertook
efforts to remove subsidies and bring the program back into solvency
with the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.68 This
resulted in higher premiums for homeowners who, in turn, convinced
Congress to reinstate many of the subsidies through passage of the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.69 As re-
formed, private insurance companies, contracted by FEMA and hired
by homeowners, administer NFIP claims from a pool of money used
to fund the flood program.70
The NFIP pool includes premiums received from homeowners and,
as natural disasters become costlier, the number of flood insurance
claims filed and homes damaged increases as well.71 Once the insur-
ance companies’ pool of money ran out, FEMA paid the remainder.72
Hurricane Sandy demonstrated that having a flood insurance policy
through NFIP does not guarantee that the policy owner will receive an
appropriate amount of relief, if any at all.73
Six times between December 2017 and July 2018, Congress
reauthorized NFIP, cancelling $16 billion of the $36 billion NFIP
owed to the U.S. Treasury and leaving NFIP with over $20 billion in
debt and just under $10 billion in additional borrowing authority so
NFIP could continue to pay claims.74 To pay claims related to Hurri-
canes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, Congress authorized NFIP to borrow
just under $11 billion from the U.S. Treasury.75 As of February 2018,
NFIP provided over $1.28 trillion in coverage to over 5 million indi-
vidual homeowners through purchased insurance policies in partici-
pating communities.76 Over 22,200 communities located in areas with
serious flooding potential voluntarily participated in NFIP.77 Home-
owners with federal mortgages who live in “high-risk areas”—mean-
ing greater than a 25% chance of flooding during a thirty year
mortgage—must purchase flood insurance through the NFIP.78 In
Texas, 83% of the homes that flooded from Harvey did not have flood
insurance.79
68. Id. at 1521.
69. Id. at 1522.
70. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 593–594.
71. Id. at 594.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. HORN & BROWN, supra note 55, at Summary.
75. Id. at 24.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 593.
78. Id. at 594.
79. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., HURRICANE HARVEY: TEXAS AT
RISK 5 (2018), http://www.glo.texas.gov/recovery/files/texas-at-risk-report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QR4G-BA4Z].
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D. Unmet Needs:  The Community Development Block Grant
Disaster Recovery Program
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
also provides substantial federal assistance after natural disasters, fo-
cusing on unmet needs not addressed by FEMA and other agencies in
disaster response.80 Established in 1974, the Community Development
Block Grant (“CDBG”) Program “provides local communities the
flexibility to decide for themselves how best to meet their own com-
munity development needs.”81
HUD has awarded CDBG funds to state and local governments
based on a formula weighing several factors, including “population,
poverty, and other housing variables.”82 Local project sponsors re-
ceive CDBG funds only if their projects meet at least one of three
national objectives: “[1] principally benefit low and moderate-income
persons; [2] aid in eliminating or preventing slums or blight; or [3]
meet particularly urgent community development needs because ex-
isting conditions pose a serious and immediate threat to the public.”83
The CDBG Disaster Recovery Grant Program (“CDBG-DR”)
serves the third national objective—addressing an immediate threat to
the public.84 Congress first authorized supplemental CDBG-DR
grants in 1993 and has provided these grants after most major natural
disaster declarations.85 CDBG-DR grants come in two broad catego-
ries: public assistance and hazard mitigation.86 State and local govern-
ments may use the CDBG-DR public assistance grants for a variety of
activities, including providing temporary housing assistance, repairing
homes and buildings damaged by a natural disaster, and for meeting
local match requirements.87 The CDBG-DR grants supplement fund-
ing from disaster programs implemented by other federal agencies,
such as FEMA.88
80. See EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33330, COMMUNITY DEVEL-
OPMENT BLOCK GRANT FUNDS IN DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY 1 (2011).
81. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program’s 40th Anniver-
sary, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm
_planning/communitydevelopment/CDBG_Turns_40 [https://perma.cc/7ZKJ-5P55]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
82. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 598.
83. BOYD, supra note 80, at 1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2; Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery Program—
Stakeholder Perspectives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 42 (2018) (prepared statement of
Carlos Martin, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute).
86. See BOYD, supra note 80, at 1.
87. Id. at 3, 5.
88. Id. at 2.
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FEMA post-disaster grants are often non-partisan but variable and
inconsistent.89 FEMA awarded $90.7 billion in post-disaster public as-
sistance grants between 1998 and 2018.90 Hurricane Katrina and
Superstorm Sandy generated $24 billion and $18 billion respectively in
post-disaster grants.91 Since 2011, Texas has been eligible for approxi-
mately $9 billion, or 20%, of the $47 billion the total post-disaster
grant funds allocated by Congress.92
Recovery and resiliency in Texas efforts after Tropical Storm Ali-
son, Hurricane Ike, and flood events in 2015 and 2016 proved less
effective in terms of aid received than responses to storms in other
states, such as Hurricane Sandy in New York and Hurricane Katrina
in Louisiana.93 Texas experienced seventy-two major disaster declara-
tions. Hurricane Ike generated approximately $3 billion post-disaster
public assistance, and so far, Hurricane Harvey, the second costliest
storm in U.S. history, has generated $5 billion in post-disaster public
assistance funding.94 Texas’ disasters in 2015 and 2016 alone affected
over 21 million people, which is more than 76% of the state’s popula-
tion and a larger population than forty-eight other states.95
E. Changing the New Deal: The Corps and the Water
Resource Development Act
The broad federal planning authority and funding that the New
Deal provided the Corps came to an end around 1965.96 Changing
public attitudes and mistrust of the Corps and government in general
led to a series of conflicts and congressional acts that frustrated large
Corps projects by 1970.97 Congress did not authorize any new major
water projects between 1970 and 1985 and scaled back several author-
89. Cf. Rachel Brasier & Jesse Thompson, FEMA to Play Long-Term Role in Re-
covery from Harvey, SW. ECON., Second Quarter 2018, at 15, 15–16 (comparing fed-
eral emergency response funding involving storm events).
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id. at 16–17.
92. Community Development & Revitalization, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., http://www
.glo.texas.gov/recovery/about/about-cdr/index.html [https://perma.cc/PC2T-8TNV]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
93. See Brasier & Thompson, supra note 89, at 15–16.
94. Id. at 17; TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION PROGRAM,
STATE OF TEXAS PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY: AMENDMENT 1 8 (2018).
95. Community Development & Revitalization, supra note 92.
96. See BILLINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 383–85; U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS,
supra note 14, at 49; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUBLIC SPENDING ON TRANSPORTATION
AND WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, 1956 to 2014 16 exhibit 8 (Mar. 2015) (showing a
sharp decline in federal spending on water transportation projects beginning in 1965);
id. at 17 exhibit 9.
97. BILLINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 399–400; see CARTER, supra note 32, at
26 (“[t]he 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §4321) and the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §1531) required federal agencies to consider
environmental impacts, increase public participation in planning, and consult with
other federal agencies.”).
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ized projects.98 Congress passed the first Water Resources Develop-
ment Act in 1974, the same year that the Stafford Act passed—
marking a departure from Congress’s normal method of appropriating
funding (albeit without authorizing new projects) for water infrastruc-
ture spending.99
Reflecting changing environmental attitudes, Jimmy Carter cam-
paigned for President in 1976 stating, “We ought to get the Army
Corps of Engineers out of the dam-building business.”100 Members of
Congress, especially Democratic members with dam-related projects
in their states and districts, fought back against President Carter.101
President Carter reached a compromise with Congress to allow some
authorized Corps projects to go forward in 1977 but, in the process,
managed to anger both Congress and his environmental supporters.102
The year 1977 proved to be the high-water mark for federal spending
on water and transportation infrastructure, reaching 38% of total U.S.
infrastructure spending (with state and local governments providing
62%).103
Federal funding for major water infrastructure projects did not re-
turn to previous levels after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 as the
Reagan Administration wrestled with inflation and other economic
policy issues.104 When the Reagan administration proposed to bring
major water infrastructure projects forward in 1982, its proposal dras-
tically reimagined the federal government’s position.105 Between 1938
and 1978, the federal government had paid on average 87% of major
water infrastructure project costs.106 In 1982, the Reagan administra-
tion proposed to essentially turn the tables, with the federal govern-
ment paying for 21% of projects, leaving local sponsors to pay for the
remaining 79%.107
Four years of debate ensued with fiscal hawks, local project spon-
sors, and environmentalists unable to agree on an approach to plan-
ning and funding major water infrastructure projects even as
infrastructure repairs became increasingly necessary.108 President
Reagan and Congress eventually reached a compromise: the 1986
98. CARTER, supra note 32, at 26.
99. Water Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-251, 88 Stat. 12;
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 10-819, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS:
ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT COULD ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS, BUT SEVERAL
CHALLENGES WOULD HAVE TO BE OVERCOME 40 (2010).
100. REUSS, supra note 14, at 49.
101. Id. at 49–50.
102. Id. at 50–51.
103. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 14.
104. REUSS, supra note 14, at 65.
105. Id. at 80–81.
106. REUSS, supra note 14, at 81.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 132.
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Water Resource Development Act (“1986 WRDA”).109 The 1986
WRDA provided cost-sharing and planning requirements for Corps
projects, funding 181 projects with $11.5 billion while constraining the
Corps’ planning, funding, and execution.110 The 1986 Act also made
these projects comply with the requirements of the 1969 National En-
vironmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).111 The 1986 WRDA also made
water resource projects much more dependent on the market econ-
omy by tying federal project funding to tonnage fees, the fuel tax, and
other revenue sources and requiring local cost sharing of at least
25%.112
Ten years after hitting its peak, federal spending on water and trans-
portation infrastructure fell to approximately 25% of federal spending
in 1987 and remained relatively consistent until 2001.113 To a certain
extent this funding decrease was offset by establishing the State Re-
volving Fund, administered by the EPA, which still provides low-inter-
est loans to state and local governments and facilitated $125 billion in
clean water infrastructure investments over two decades.114 Federal
funding rose from 2001 until 2003, then fell 19% between 2003 and
2014.115
After the passage of 1986 WRDA, Congress and successive Presi-
dential administrations authorized new WRDA projects every other
year until 2004.116 In 2007, Congress was able to pass a bill (“2007
WRDA”) and override President Bush’s veto to providing funding
and authorizations projects under the WRDA process.117 The “stan-
dard” WRDA process starts with congressional authorization and
then proceeds to a feasibility study by a sponsor, either the Corps or a
local agency (which requires local input), a Corps Chief’s Report, and
congressional approval, before the sponsor can construct projects con-
sistent with Congressional authorization.118 Under WRDA, projects
must make it through NEPA review—which requires approval from
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—and the 1936 re-
quirement of economic benefit analysis.119
Local sponsors and critics expressed frustration with the constraints
of the standard WRDA process and the seeming failure on timely pro-
109. See id.
110. Id. at 183.
111. CARTER, supra note 32, at 11.
112. See REUSS, supra note 14, at 197–98.
113. Id. at 197.
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 1383 (2011); see also TEX. WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR
TEXAS 2012 STATE WATER PLAN (2012), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/state
_water_plan/2012/2012_SWP.pdf?d=12861.89999995986 [https://perma.cc/WQ9U-
57WW].
115. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 14.
116. CARTER, supra note 32, at 4.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 11–12.
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ject delivery.120 In 2010, the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) provided a report to Congress recommending that the
Corps receive a more reliable source of funds to improve project de-
livery.121 The GAO provided another report to Congress in 2013 with
a less than favorable review of the standard WRDA process and sug-
gested that local sponsors have more opportunities to lead projects.122
Congress provided the Corps with alternative delivery options in the
2014 and 2016 Water Resources Development Acts (the “2014
WRDA” and “2016 WRDA”).123 The 2014 WRDA included the
Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (“WIFIA”), which
allowed both the EPA and the Corps to create direct loans and loan
guarantee programs for certain categories of water project.124
As of February 2018, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had a list
of authorized construction and dam safety projects totaling $96 billion
but an average annual appropriation of $1.9 billion.125 The Corps
failed to implement the WIFIA Program as of 2018, meaning that the
$175 million provided under WIFIA is not available.126 The Corps did
implement its Continuing Authority Programs (“CAPs”), which pro-
vide the Corps with an internal process for reviewing, funding, and
implementing projects under $10 million for identified purposes, such
as erosion control, and receives up to $20 million per year.127 Con-
gress has also authorized a Rehabilitation and Inspection Program
(“RIP”) that allows the Corps to undertake projects to inspect and
repair levees after storms with a 20% local match.128
F. Mitigation Attempts:  FEMA and EPA Reforms
in the Twenty-First Century
Congress passed the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (“2000
DMA”) to require local governments to assess risk and develop haz-
ard mitigation plans in order to qualify for greater assistance from
FEMA in disaster response and recovery.129 The legislation aimed to
incentivize preventative efforts by states and capped individual home
repair assistance at $5,000 per household.130 The implementation of
the hazard-mitigation plans required under 2000 DMA has been
120. Id. at 16.
121. REUSS, supra note 14, at 30.
122. CARTER, supra note 32, at 16–17.
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id. at 16.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id. at 16.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. at 20.
129. ANDREA M. JACKMAN, GARY S. NESTLER & MARIO G. BREUVIDES, UNITED
NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, THE DISASTER MITIGATION ACT
OF 2000: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF RISK REDUCTION IN AMERICAN LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT 1 (2015).
130. LINDSAY & MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 17.
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somewhat lacking with only Florida qualifying for the enhanced miti-
gation funding.131 Some jurisdictions have failed to update, or in some
cases even complete, the required plans.132
President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) in 2003 in response to the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.133 DHS began supervising many federal agencies, in-
cluding FEMA.134 In 2005, when Hurricane Katrina struck New
Orleans, it tested FEMA’s new structure and placement within DHS,
which uncovered systemic failures.135 Review of FEMA’s response
concluded that FEMA’s mismanagement during Katrina cost taxpay-
ers up to $2 billion.136 Congress then enacted the Post-Katrina Emer-
gency Management Reform Act of 2006, which reorganized FEMA,
made it more autonomous within DHS, and removed FEMA’s anti-
terrorist responsibilities.137 The 2006 Act also put additional burdens
on state and local entities to prove that expenditures were not waste-
ful or fraudulent.138 Several amendments to the Stafford Act were
proposed before and after Superstorm Sandy in 2012.139
Flood-related disasters between 2000 and 2018 totaled over $750
billion in economic losses.140 Despite attempts to emphasize mitiga-
tion in the 2000 DMA, pre-disaster mitigation funding decreased be-
tween 2004 and 2014 from $157 million to $19 million while FEMA
public assistance grants between 1998 and 2018 totaled $90.8 bil-
lion.141 During the 2004 to 2014 period, federal agencies committed
over $277 billion in disaster-related funding—less than $1 billion of
this funding was for pre-disaster mitigation funding.142 FEMA’s Flood
Mitigation Assistance Grant Program received only $160 million in
FY 2018.143 Many organizations from the Pew Charitable Trust to the
West Houston Association have encouraged Congress to expand the
131. JACKMAN, NESTLER & BREUVIDES, supra note 129, at 6.
132. FED. INS. AND MITIGATION ADMIN. (FEMA), HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN
STATUS (2018), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1534266359629-01e90efe4f6
2f4510898f244a5501f41/Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4EE-U736].
133. Sugarman, supra note 39, at 586–87.
134.  Id.
135. Id. at 587.
136. Id. at 587 (quoting Eric Lipton, ‘Breathtaking’ Waste and Fraud in Hurricane
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/washington/27ka
trina.html [https://perma.cc/P8G8-HE9F]).
137. Id. at 588.
138. Id.; 152 CONG. REC. H3,329 (daily ed. May 25, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Jindal) (“I have an amendment to reduce FEMA waste, fraud, and abuse.”).
139. See Sugarman, supra note 39, at 587, 591.




142. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-797, FEDERAL DISASTER ASSIS-
TANCE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 1–2 (2016).
143. FED. INS. AND MITIGATION ADMIN. (FEMA), FACT SHEET: FY 2018 FLOOD
MITIGATION ASSISTANCE (FMA) GRANT PROGRAM 1–2 (2018) https://www.fema
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-2\TWR201.txt unknown Seq: 16 19-MAR-19 11:18
122 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
State Revolving Loan Program, administered by the EPA, to include
flood-control projects that would increase pre-disaster mitigation
funding.144
G. Sharing Risk and Rewards:  The Gulf of Mexico
Energy Security Act
Congress passed the 2006 Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act
(“GOMESA”), which had been introduced years earlier, after the
hurricanes of 2004 and 2005 caused extensive coastal damage.145
GOMESA opened section 181 and 181 South in the Gulf of Mexico
(approximately 2.5 million acres) to offshore drilling within one year
of its enactment.146 GOMESA requires revenue sharing on new areas
of production in the 181 Area from FY 2007 through 2016 as follows:
(1) 50% of the revenues from this project will be deposited into the
Federal Treasury; (2) 37.5% of the revenues will be deposited with the
Gulf-producing states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama);
and (3) 12.5% of the revenues will be deposited in the Federal Land
and Water Conservation Fund.147
Each state receives a minimum of 10% of shared revenue and
coastal political subdivisions of each state receive 20% of the state’s
revenue148 These revenues directed to the states are restricted in that
the money only can be used for coastal protection; mitigation of dam-
age to wildlife or natural resources; implementation of a federally-ap-
proved marine, coastal, or comprehensive management plan; onshore
infrastructure projects; or up to 3% of funds for planning assistance
and administrative costs of compliance.149
Congress chose to share royalties with states in GOMESA even
though the judicial branch had not required it to do so.150 The passing
of GOMESA marked a compromise between environmental concerns
of coastal states and calls for national energy development.151 Con-
.gov/media-library-data/1534266359629-01e90efe4f62f4510898f244a5501f41/Fact_
Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKE7-JBFG].
144. Needed: A New Federal-State Partnership for Flood Mitigation, supra at note
140; West Houston Association, Resolution in Support of Expanding the Federal
State Revolving Loan Program to Include Flood Control Projects (May 22, 2018); see
Ben Chou et al., Using State Revolving Funds to Build Climate-Resilient Communities,
NAT. RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL (June 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/
state-revolving-funds-IP.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6RM-PW46] (suggesting that SRF
amendments could be used in a variety of ways to improve resiliency, including flood
control).
145. 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5-1 (2007).
146. Patrick B. Sanders, Note, Blanco v. Burton: Louisiana’s Stuggle for Coopera-
tive Federalism in Offshore Energy Development, 69 LA. L. REV. 255, 276 (2008).
147. Id.
148. 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 5-1 (2007).
149. Id.
150. Sanders, supra note 146, at 277.
151. Id. at 277–278.
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gress acted somewhat conservatively by delaying royalty sharing for a
number of years and including only a small area of the Gulf in the
program.152 However, Congress may have set the stage for coopera-
tion in future offshore energy development.153 Because royalty shar-
ing is critical for continued financing of coastal restoration, states like
Louisiana hope that Congress will pass additional legislation to ex-
pand this model.154
According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
GOMESA currently provides an estimated $125 million per year.155
GOMESA funding is ostensibly intended to address environmental
risks associated with off-shore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. Mary
Landrieu, a former United States Senator from Louisiana, suggested
that Texas could use this funding for coastal storm surge protection.
Such a large revenue stream, if stabilized, could secure bonds for
coastal protection for citizens and industry close to the coast.
III. THE STATE OF TEXAS UNDER THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK:
SUPPLEMENTING LIMITED GOVERNMENT
Hurricane Harvey provides a case study on how the State of Texas
navigated through the challenges of recovery, how it engaged with the
federal government via the Stafford Act, and its desire to change pol-
icy and craft long-lasting solutions.
For a conservative state that prides itself on small government,
Texas has some large agencies and resources that have proved useful,
if not exemplary, in disaster recovery. The Legislature could adopt a
variety of changes suggested by state leaders and others, making Texas
an international example on emergency response and flood mitigation
planning.
A. Rebuild Texas:  State Government Response to Hurricane
Harvey Under the Stafford Act
As of 2018, Texas leads the nation in the number of natural disaster
declarations.156 In 2011 alone, Governor Rick Perry signed fifty-seven
major disaster declarations.157 Until August 22, when Hurricane Har-
152. Id. at 278.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 279.
155. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act
(GOMESA), https://www.boem.gov/Revenue-Sharing/ [https://perma.cc/V9MN-D9
QX] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
156. FEMA, Disaster Declarations by State/Tribal Government, https://www.fema
.gov/disasters/state-tribal-government/ [https://perma.cc/ALD8-2F42] (last visited
Oct. 18, 2018).
157. FEMA, Data Visualizations: Disaster Declarations for States and Counties,
(Texas Slide) https://www.fema.gov/data-visualization-disaster-declarations-states-
and-counties [https://perma.cc/RTF9-2LAS] (last updated May 03, 2018).
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vey’s intensity began to grow at an alarming rate, 2017 seemed like a
relatively calm year.158
Governor Abbott requested a major disaster declaration for Hurri-
cane Harvey on August 23, 2017.159 Two days later on August 25, the
day Hurricane Harvey made land fall, President Donald Trump signed
the “Texas Disaster Declaration” and authorized assistance for actions
beginning on August 23.160 Over the next five days, Hurricane Harvey
poured a record-breaking 34 trillion gallons of water over coastal ar-
eas; overshadowing other storm impacts, including the initial landfall
and storm surge in Aransas County and tornadoes in the southern
region of Harris County and the surrounding area.161
The hurricane may have received less national attention if it had not
affected commodities such as petroleum.162 Because of Hurricane
Harvey, U.S. gasoline prices surged by $0.33 in the weeks following
the storm.163 With few exceptions, all businesses along the Texas coast
from ports, trade, energy production, tourism, and agriculture faced
shutdown or significant interruption for a week or longer.164
On September 7, Governor Abbott tapped the Texas A&M Univer-
sity System’s Chancellor and former Democratic State Comptroller
John Sharp to lead the disaster aid recovery efforts and put together
the state plans required under the Stafford Act.165 On September 18,
FEMA approved $1.09 billion in federal funding for individual assis-
158. FEMA, Disasters, https://www.fema.gov/disasters [https://perma.cc/CF5Z-
ZHTP] (click on Texas and limit to 2017) (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
159. Greg Abbott, Governor Greg Abbott Extendeds the State Disaster Declaration
for Texas counties affected by Hurricane Harvey., OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR (Aug. 7,
2018) https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-greg-abbott-extendeds-the-state-disas
ter-declaration-for-texas-counties-affected-by-hurricane-harvey [https://perma.cc/449
L-N2DX]; The selection of Chancellor Sharp makes more sense when the role of
university systems in the development Texas Hazard Mitigation Plan is considered.
See TEX. DIV. OF EMERGENCY MGMT., STATE OF TEXAS HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN,
2013 UPDATE 2 (Oct. 15, 2013) (providing information on the plan development).
160. THE WHITE HOUSE, President Donald J. Trump Approves Texas Disaster Dec-
laration, (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trump-approves-texas-disaster-declaration/ [https://perma.cc/2P58-BPEM].
161. TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION PROGRAM, STATE OF
TEXAS PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY: HURRICANE HARVEY AMENDMENT NO. 1 4
(2018).
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Petroleum & Other Liquids, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://
www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/ [https://perma.cc/5UPZ-3WNC] (last visited Sept.
20, 2018)).
164. TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION PROGRAM, STATE OF
TEXAS PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY: HURRICANE HARVEY 3 (2018).
165. Greg Abbott, Governor Abbott Signs Proclamation Creating Governor’s Com-
mission to Rebuild Texas, OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR (Sept. 7, 2017) https://gov.texas.gov/
news/post/governor-abbott-signs-proclamation-creating-governors-commission-to-re
build [https://perma.cc/8DD4-XS3E]; REBUILD TEX., REQUEST FOR FEDERAL ASSIS-
TANCE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS (Oct. 31, 2017).
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tance and a further $597 million for public assistance.166 FEMA pro-
vided $333 million for individual assistance, including temporary
housing, home repairs, and rental assistance.167 FEMA approved a
further $146 million for grants related to personal property and help
with medical, legal, and other disaster-related expenses.168 NFIP
claimants received $347 million.169 The Small Business Administration
approved more than $265 million in low-interest loans to homeown-
ers, renters, and business owners.170 FEMA also provided the State of
Texas with $181 million for state and local government costs of debris
removal and emergency response and provided $516 million to thirty
federal agencies authorized to assist with response and recovery oper-
ations.171 The first temporary housing unit for Hurricane Harvey ar-
rived on October 7, 2018, six weeks after the President’s disaster
declaration.172
Within ten weeks of Hurricane Harvey, Chancellor Sharp and his
team compiled a comprehensive flood infrastructure mitigation plan
that requested $61 billion of federal aid to address related damages
and needs.173 In his letter to Governor Abbott, prefacing the Rebuild
Texas Plan, Chancellor Sharp stated that the plan was not “complete
or exhaustive” but merely represented “a broad range of the types of
improvements necessary” to future-proof the state’s coastal areas.174
The plan included projects ranging from large land purchases and
major reservoir projects to bridge replacements and channel
improvements.175
On February 9, 2018, Congresses enacted the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2018 (“HR 1892”), which provided $89.3 billion in funding for
mitigation efforts, and Congress appropriated a total of $136 billion
related to all 2017 major disasters.176 While HR 1892 did not provide
166. FEMA, More Than $1 Billion in Federal Funds Approved for Texas Survivors,







172. TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., HURRICANE HARVEY: TEXAS AT RISK 6 (Sept. 2018).
173. REBUILD TEX., REQUEST FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE CRITICAL INFRASTRUC-
TURE PROJECTS (Oct. 31, 2017).
174. Letter from John Sharp, Comm’r, Governor’s Comm’n to Rebuild Texas, to
Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas (Oct. 31, 2017) (on file in Rebuild Texas: Request
for Federal Assistance Critical Infrastructure Projects, Governor’s Commission to Re-
build Texas, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4164748-Rebuild-Texas-RE
QUEST-FOR-FEDERAL-ASSISTANCE.html [https://perma.cc/DU72-BPTQ]).
175. REBUILD TEX., REQUEST FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE CRITICAL INFRASTRUC-
TURE PROJECTS (Oct. 31, 2017) https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4164748-
Rebuild-Texas-REQUEST-FOR-FEDERAL-ASSISTANCE.html [https://perma.cc/
6YLA-K6W6].
176. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123 (2018); see also
PAINTER, supra note 3, at 5–15; see also THAD COCHRAN, SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRI-
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funding to address all of the requests made in the Rebuild Texas Plan,
it did provide significant assistance opportunities.177 Texas and other
states are creating plans and completing applications to take advan-
tage of those opportunities, and thereby improving long-term disaster
response and resiliency.178
B. Meeting Needs:  The Texas General Land Office
and Disaster Recovery
One of the first acts passed by the Republic of Texas in 1836 estab-
lished its General Land Office (“GLO”) to determine land ownership
after the Republic gained independence from Mexico.179 The GLO’s
website states that it is the oldest state agency in Texas and that the
office of Texas Land Commissioner predates the Office of Gover-
nor.180 The Texas Constitution of 1876 established a Permanent
School Fund using half of Texas’s remaining lands with GLO acting as
administrator, which expanded GLO’s role into land management.181
In 2011, GLO gained a new role administering the State of Texas
Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (“CDBG-
DR”) Program.182
As a response to Hurricane Harvey and other storms, Congress al-
located $90 billion in Federal Community Development Block
CDBG-DR. On July 25, 2018, GLO finalized its first State Action
Plan, requesting a $57.8 million share of that funding.183 This rela-
tively small share of funding was all that HUD provided on December
27, 2017.184 Later, HUD announced Texas would receive $5 billion in
ATIONS FOR DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY 1 (2018), https://www.appropria
tions.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/020718-SUPPLEMENTAL-SUMMARY.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y58B-QTKD].
177. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123 (2018).
178. See generally REBUILD TEX., supra note 175; see generally FLA. DEP’T OF
ECON. OPPORTUNITY, STATE OF FLORIDA ACTION PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY
(Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.floridajobs.org/docs/default-source/community-develop
ment-files/2018-state-of-florida-cdbg-dr-action-plan-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JQV-
NJUQ].
179. ANDREA GURASICH MORGAN, LAND: A HISTORY OF THE TEXAS GENERAL
LAND OFFICE xi, (Charles Worth Ward ed., 1992); The Texas General Land Office is
the Oldest State Agency in Texas, Established by the Constitution of the Republic of
Texas, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., http://www.glo.texas.gov/the-glo/about/overview/index
.html [https://perma.cc/G3XW-WDR6] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
180. The Texas General Land Office is the oldest state agency in Texas, established
by the Constitution of the Republic of Texas, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., http://www
.glo.texas.gov/the-glo/about/overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/HH9P-DBSU]
(last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
181. Id.
182. Community Development & Revitalization, supra note 92.
183. TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION PROGRAM, STATE OF
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CDBG-DR (June 25, 2018) and an additional $625 million (Septem-
ber 14, 2018) in CDBG-DR allocations.185 CDBG-DR funds have
great utility because they may be used as a match for other federal
programs like FEMA or the Corps projects.186
All of the CDBG-DR funds provided to Texas came with a signifi-
cant number of conditions.187 HUD required 70% of the funds must
be spent on low- to moderate-income (“LMI”) projects.188 Texas and
its subdivisions have only two years to begin spending the CDBG-DR
funds; the entire allocation must be spent within six years of HUD’s
execution of the initial grant agreement.189 Any new housing receiving
CDBG-DR funds must meet HUD’s Green Building Standard, and all
new structures receiving CDBG-DR assistance must be elevated to
two feet over base flood elevation.190 Certain properties cannot re-
ceive CDBG-DR assistance, including private utilities, second homes,
and homes with homeowners without flood insurance who earn over
120% of area median income.191
GLO’s State Action Plan provided a three-way division of the non-
administrative funds from the July 25 allocation of $5.024 billion in
CDBG-DR funds the office received from HUD. The division had
$1.156 billion going to Harris County’s plan, $1.156 billion going to
the City of Houston, and $2.51 billion staying with GLO for distribu-
tion to the rest of the state.192 Based on GLO’s analysis, unmet hous-
ing needs totaled nearly  $12 billion, while unmet infrastructure and
economic development needs total approximately $63 billion and $23
billion, respectively.193 The combined plans proposed to dedicate $3.6
billion to various LMI housing programs that will build new housing,
185. Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements
for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees, 83 Fed. Reg.
157, 40314, 40315–40316 (proposed Aug. 14, 2018).
186. TEX. DIV. OF EMERGENCY MGMT., supra note 159.
187. See Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Require-
ments for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees; State
of Texas Allocation, 82 Fed. Reg. 247, 61320 (proposed Dec. 17, 2017).
188. See id. (referring to TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION
PROGRAM., STATE OF TEXAS PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY: HURRICANE HARVEY
AMENDMENT NO. 1 2 (2018)).
189. Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Requirements
for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees, 82 Fed. Reg.
247 61320, 61322 (proposed Sept. 18, 2018).
190. See Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative Require-
ments for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Grantees; State
of Texas Allocation, 82 Fed. Reg 247, 61320 (proposed Dec. 17, 2017) (referencing
TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION PROGRAM., STATE OF TEXAS
PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY: HURRICANE HARVEY AMENDMENT NO. 2 21–22
(2017)).
191. TEX. GEN. LAND OFF. CMTY. DEV. & REVITALIZATION PROGRAM., STATE OF
TEXAS PLAN FOR DISASTER RECOVERY: STATE OF TEXAS PLAN FOR DISASTER RE-
COVERY: HURRICANE HARVEY – ROUND 1 48 (2018).
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id. at 8.
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repair existing housing, and provide housing opportunities for people
making below 120% of the median wage.194 The amended plan allo-
cated approximately $852 million for infrastructure and economic re-
vitalization—the City of Houston made no provision for infrastructure
in this version of the plan.195
C. Hazardous Work: The Texas Division
of Emergency Management
The State of Texas and its subdivisions provided much less disaster
assistance than the federal government until the Federal Disaster Re-
lief Act of 1950 required states to request assistance.196 The Texas
Legislature, when it next convened, voted unanimously for the 1951
Civil Protection Act.197 The state act provided compliance with the
Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 and tracked many of the federal
act’s basic provisions.198
The 1951 Civil Protection Act made the governor head of the Texas
Disaster Relief Council, which included various state department di-
rectors.199 The act also called for the creation of the Office of Defense
and Disaster Relief.200 The Texas Legislature saw the primary purpose
of the 1951 Civil Protection Act as preparation for a response to nu-
clear war. Over the next three decades, the Texas Legislature spent
several sessions renaming and reorganizing the Office of Defense and
Disaster Relief before settling in 1981 on the current name and organ-
ization: the Texas Division of Emergency Management (“TDEM”).201
The Office of Defense and Disaster Relief was first called into ac-
tion after floods along the Rio Grande Valley in 1954 and then again
after Hurricane Carla in 1961.202 In 1963, the Texas Legislature moved
the Office of Defense and Disaster Relief, making it a division of the
Texas Department of Public Safety.203 A year after the Stafford Act,
194. TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., supra note 161, at 132.
195. Id. at 18.
196. James A. Marten, Emergency Management, HANDBOOK TEXAS (June 12,
2010), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mze01 [https://perma.cc/485N-
6R7C]; Moss, supra note 12, at 315; see Disaster Relief Act of 1950, supra note 40, at
Sec. 2(a).
197. Marten, supra note 196.
198. The Texas Civil Protection Act’s contents and timing are indicative of a state
response to federal mandates.
199. Marten, supra note 196.
200. Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Texas Department of Public
Safety: Agency History, TEXAS DIGITAL ARCHIVE, https://tsl.access.preservica.com/
tda/texas-state-agencies/dps/agency-history [https://perma.cc/TP63-7Q6B] (last visited
Oct. 19, 2018).
201. Marten, supra note 196.
202. Id.
203. See Laurie E. Jasinski, Texas Department of Public Safety, HANDBOOK TEXAS,
https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mctrp [https://perma.cc/MJ4Q-9WX2]
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (documenting the Department of Public Safety’s creation
in 1935 and its original divisions, including the Texas Highway Patrol, Texas Rangers,
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the Texas Legislature passed the Texas Disaster Act of 1975, which
created what is now Chapter 418 of the Texas Government Code.204
In 2004, TDEM created its first State of Texas Hazard Mitigation
Plan (Texas Mitigation Plan) to comply with Congress’s 2000 DMA.205
In 2013, two years after setting the U.S. record for major disaster dec-
larations in a single year, Texas released its fourth and latest update to
the Texas Mitigation Plan.206 The 2013 Texas Mitigation Planning
Team consisted not only of representatives from relevant state depart-
ments but representatives from the state’s major university systems.207
Many local government representatives participated through the
Emergency Management Association of Texas and produced county
or regional mitigation plans.208 A number of federal agencies were
also involved with the Texas Mitigation Plan and provided grants as
part of the process.209
After Hurricane Harvey, FEMA provided more than $1 billion to
the State of Texas through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
(“HMGP”).210 Despite state coordination efforts, less than half of
Texas counties were eligible to receive HMGP funds because they
failed to submit or renew their hazard mitigation plans, a requirement
for such grants.211 Due in part to Texas’s low participation rate, Texas
cannot produce an Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan, reducing the
state’s eligibility for HMGP funding by 5%.212
and Bureaus of Communications, Intelligence, Education, and Identification and
Records).
204. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 418.001 (2017).
205. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF TEXAS HAZARD MITIGA-
TION PLAN (2013 update).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 3.
208. Id. at 2–4.
209. Id. at 15.
210. 2018 Natural Hazard Risk Assessments and Mitigation Planning, COMMUNITY
HAZARD ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION PLANNING SERV., http://www.champ-services
.us/ [https://perma.cc/3DLG-XDZ4] (last visited Sept. 19, 2018); see Hazard Mitiga-
tion Grant Program, TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.dps.texas
.gov/dem/Mitigation/hmgp_fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y83A-YTDD] (stating
the requirements for FEMA hazard mitigation grants).
211. COMMUNITY HAZARD ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION PLANNING SERV., supra
note 210. See Emergency Preparedness: Assisting Regions and Their Communities with
All-hazards Planning, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Efforts, TEX. ASS’N REG.
COUNCILS, https://txregionalcouncil.org/regional-programs/emergency-preparedness/
[https://perma.cc/L7XD-8SQZ] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (discussing the role of re-
gional policy councils in various functions related to hazard mitigation and response).
212. Hazard Mitigation Plan Status, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitiga
tion-plan-status [https://perma.cc/SN2Q-UEFF] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018); see 44
CFR 201.5 (2018) (providing relevant regulatory guidance).
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D. From Droughts to Floods:  The Texas
Water Development Board
The predecessor to the Texas Water Development Board
(“TWBD”), the Texas Board of Water Engineers, was created by the
Texas Legislature in 1913 after droughts in 1909 and 1910.213 The
Board of Water Engineers was intended to plan, fund, and build
water-related infrastructure as well as administer and adjudicate water
rights under a new appropriation system.214 The Texas Supreme Court
declared the Board of Water Engineers and accompanying legislation
unconstitutional in 1921 after it was sued for its adjudicative role.215
The worst droughts in Texas history during the 1940s and 1950s led the
Texas Legislature to try again by creating TWBD in 1957 to adminis-
ter the Texas Water Development Fund and to coordinate state water
planning efforts.216
Subsequently, TWDB went through several reorganizations but re-
mained focused on loaning and occasionally granting funds to local
government entities for water-related infrastructure and creating state
water plans.217 After droughts in the 1990s, the Texas Legislature
passed Senate Bill 1 in 1997, which strengthened TWDB’s planning
responsibilities and required a state water plan based on regional
plans developed by groups of local water rightsholders.218 This bot-
tom-up approach helped identify, prioritize, and build water supply
projects, municipal supply projects in particular, in subsequent state
water plans.219
213. 55 Leg. R.S., H.J.R. 3; 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws; Irrigation Act of 1913, 1636–1638
33 Leg. R.S., ch. 171, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, 358-79; Texas Water Development Board,
TEX. STATE LIBRARY & ARCHIVES COMM’N, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/tslac/
20175/tsl-20175.html [https://perma.cc/4V97-5FLY] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018); About
the Texas Water Development Board, TEX. WATER DEV. BOARD, http://www.twdb.tex
as.gov/about/index.asp [https://perma.cc/QRT7-MJHK] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
214. TEX. STATE LIBRARY & ARCHIVES COMM’N, supra note 213; see Augustus L.
Campbell, Comment, Texas Watermasters: A Legal History and Analysis of Surface
Water Rights Enforcement, 7 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 143, 144, 146–57 (2006) (provid-
ing a brief history of the Texas water rights system).
215. Bd. of Water Eng’rs v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 97, 229 S.W. 301, 307 (1921)
(holding that the board’s adjudication functions violated the separation of powers
provided in the Texas Constitutions).
216. Glenn Hegar, Funding the State Water Plan Through the SWIFT Program,
TEX. COMPTROLLER PUB. ACCOUNTS, Special Report at 1 https://comptroller.texas
.gov/economy/docs/96-1790.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C98-5BAN] [hereinafter SWIFT
Report]; TEX. STATE LIBRARY & ARCHIVES COMM’N, supra note 213.
217. TEX. STATE LIBRARY & ARCHIVES COMM’N, supra note 213.
218. Water for Texas: 2017 State Water Plan, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. at 23, http://
www.twdb.texas.gov/waterplanning/swp/2017/chapters/00-SWP17-EXEC-SUM-
MARY.pdf?d=23701.00000000093 [https://perma.cc/L8WL-KTBF]; SWIFT Report,
supra note 216, at 2.
219. See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 218, at 10, Fig. ES9 (discussing and
depicting fulfillment of municipal water demand); SWIFT Report, supra note 216, at 6
(discussing prioritization and SWIFT funding in 2015).
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Droughts in 2010 and 2011 spurred the Texas Legislature in 2013 to
address the biggest remaining impediment to the State Water Plan’s
implementation: funding.220 A slate of bills from the Texas Legislature
created the State Water Infrastructure Fund of Texas (“SWIFT”) with
credit facilities and $2 billion from the Economic Stabilization Fund
(“ESF”), which is projected to provide 1.5 million acre-feet of water
from $27 billion in funding for regional water supply projects over
fifty years.221 Texas voters approved the creation of SWIFT and the $2
billion in funding from the ESF (Proposition 6) by almost 75%.222
In 1999, the Texas Legislature required cities and counties to meet
NFIP requirements by adopting the necessary ordinances and or-
ders.223 In 2001, Texas had more flood-prone land and more annual
flood-related deaths than any other state in the nation.224 In 2007, the
Legislature made TWDB the NFIP State Coordinating Agency, ex-
panding TWDB’s duties to include the following: administering
grants, floodplain mapping and regulation, compliance assistance, and
technical assistance related to NFIP.225 While FEMA is responsible
for developing Flood Insurance Rate Maps, it relies on data and ad-
ministration from TWDB and cooperating technical partners
(“CTPs”).226 In 2018, Texas had 1,252 NFIP-participating communi-
ties, but only 20% had updated flood maps and approximately 0.05%
(62 communities) qualified for the Community Rating System
(“CRS”), which provides residents with up to a 45% discount on flood
insurance rates.227
In September 2018, TWDB released a draft state-wide flood assess-
ment (“TWDB Draft”).228 The TWDB Draft cited several documents
to explain flood risk and singled out TDEM’s Texas Mitigation Plan in
220. SWIFT Report, supra note 216, at 2. The TWDB also went through a reorgani-
zation at the Board level, swapping a six-person volunteer board, for a three-person
professional board. Id. at 3.
221. Id. at 2–3.
222. Id. at 3.
223. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.3145 (2017); Lake et al., State Flood Assess-
ment, (Sept.17, 2018) at 23 [hereinafter TWDB Draft] (forthcoming).
224. What You Need to Know About Floodplain Management, CITY NEW BRAUN-
FELS, https://www.nbtexas.org/1156/Floodplain-Management [https://perma.cc/598N-
M9PK] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (citing S. Interim Comm. on Natural Resources,
87th Legislature, Natural Disasters, at 6 (Tex. 2002), https://senate.texas.gov/cmtes/77/
c580/c580_NATRES.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BSK-P9A7]).
225. Flood Mitigation Planning, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., http://www.twdb.texas.gov/
flood/index.asp [https://perma.cc/FWV5-UUQM] (last visited Dec. 29, 2018); see
Texas Quick Guide: Floodplain Management in Texas, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. (2015),
https://www.twdb.texas.gov/flood/resources/doc/Texas_Quick_Guide.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2A9V-KQJP] (providing regulatory guidance); Flood Mitigation Assistance
Grant Program, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. (Apr. 2018), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publi
cations/shells/Floodmitigationassistance.pdf?d=2630698.500000057 [https://perma.cc/
V9EG-P8BQ].
226. TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 18–19.
227. Id. at 18, 23.
228. Id. at 1.
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particular.229 Texas’s flood risk maps, even the updated ones, are out-
dated—over 55% of the homes that were flooded during Hurricane
Harvey were located outside the floodplain.230 The majority of those
homes were in CRS communities or communities with updated flood
maps.231
On September 27, 2018, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency (“NOAA”) released an updated precipitation model for
Texas called Atlas 14, Volume 11 (“Atlas 14”).232 Atlas 14’s data
showed a substantial increase in the probability of extreme storm
events.233 Likewise, the new data and mapping shows that a “100-
year” storm event is up by five inches in a twenty-four-hour period
(i.e., from thirteen inches to eighteen inches) in some parts of Harris
County.234 Atlas 14 supersedes old flood data from the 1960s and
1970s and requires changes to FEMA’s floodplain maps across
Texas.235 New maps will lead to changes in flood risks and the under-
standing of impacts, which now appear to be substantially greater and
especially near urban centers.236
IV. THINKING OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK:  IDEAS ON HOW TO
IMPROVE DISASTER MITIGATION IN TEXAS
A recent report by the GLO, Hurricane Harvey: Texas at Risk
(“GLO Report”), noted the complication and dependence associated
with the federal disaster recovery framework and associated fund-
ing.237 The GLO Report also indicated that Congressional action re-
lated to disaster recovery appears difficult.238 Texas, through its
Legislature and agencies, can be much better prepared for disaster by
working with federal and local government agencies before the next
storm.
229. Id. at 10.
230. NATSIOS, supra note 79, at 23.
231. NATSIOS, supra note 79, at 33. See also TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 20.
232. NOAA Texas Rainfall Frequency Values, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/noaa-updates-texas-rain
fall-frequency-values [https://perma.cc/5XY7-K8MM] [hereinafter NOAA Updates].
233. Id.
234. TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 7.
235. Id. See Carolyn LaFleur, NOAA ATLAS 14: Updated Rainfall Fata Under-
score Challenges of Managing Flood Risk, (June 2018), https://www.harcresearch.org/
feature/NOAA_Atlas_14_Updated_Rainfall_Data_Underscore_Challenges_of_Man
aging [https://perma.cc/6VS7-NQSX].
236. TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 12–13.
237. NATSIOS, supra note 79, at 14.
238. Id.
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A. How the State Should Mitigate:  Improving Texas
Hazard Mitigation Planning
Despite leading the nation in natural disaster declarations and in
planning efforts for water and transportation, when it comes to hazard
mitigation planning, Texas lags behind other states such as Florida.239
The GLO Report sensibly recommended that the TWDB should take
the lead in flood control mitigation planning and projects.240 How-
ever, including flood control in the Texas Hazard Mitigation Plan, as
mentioned in the TWDB Draft Report, would help all Texans by im-
proving response and resiliency for all types of natural disasters and
other emergencies.241 This approach would also help increase Texas’s
share of federal assistance and reduce the state’s complexity in dealing
with both federal and local actors, assuming Texas can obtain an En-
hanced Hazard Mitigation Plain rating.242
The TWDB Draft reviewed Florida’s planning approach and its En-
hanced Hazard Mitigation Plan.243 Florida’s 2018 mitigation plan re-
lied on a comprehensive hazard mitigation strategy committed to
integrating mitigation practices throughout the state.244 Because of
Florida’s approach and record, FEMA delegates approval authority to
Florida for its local hazard mitigation plans.245 Florida’s plan also in-
creases reliance on its Regional Planning Councils (“RPCs”) to work
with the state and local governments to develop hazard mitigation
planning and analysis and to coordinate emergency response for every
county in the state.246
Like Florida, the State of Texas also works through its RPCs to pro-
vide funding and assistance to local governments to produce local
Hazard Mitigation Plans.247 Directly tasking RPCs with improving city
and county participation and plan completion would likely be much
easier, cheaper, and more immediate than using TWDB’s planning
structures or creating new ones. Texas could require RPCs to create
local hazard-mitigation councils—mirroring RPCs’ transportation pol-
icy councils—with technical advisory committees that combine local
government staff experts with representatives from business and citi-
zen groups.
239. See id. at 25.
240. NATSIOS, supra note 79, at 25.
241. See generally TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 58.
242. See Enhanced State Hazard Mitigation Plan, FLA. DIVISION EMERGENCY
MGMT. (2018), https://www.floridadisaster.org/globalassets/dem/mitigation/mitigate-
fl—shmp/shmp-2018-full_final_approved.6.11.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE75-8KNJ]
[hereinafter 2018 Florida Plan].
243. TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 29.
244. 2018 Florida Plan, supra note 242, at 5.
245. TWDB Draft, supra note 223, at 29.
246. 2018 Florida Plan, supra note 242, at 64–67.
247. State of Texas Hazard Mitigation Plan, TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, 260 https://
www.dps.texas.gov/dem/documents/txHazMitPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE2X-6L3A]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
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One advantage of the Texas Water Plan is the high level of partici-
pation in its bottom-up, regional approach to analyze and prioritize
regional strategies and projects. These same advantages are provided
by the Texas RPCs for transportation planning that are integrated into
the Statewide Transportation Improvement Plan.248 Hazard mitigation
projects are more like transportation projects than water supply
projects—Texas voters see the need for these types of infrastructure
but are used to paying only water bills. Local governments from
across the state would likely participate in hazard mitigation planning
if it were funded more like water planning and transportation
planning.249
B. Putting Money Where the Mitigation Is:
Funding for Mitigation in Texas
The State of Texas will spend approximately $547 billion on trans-
portation projects, excluding maintenance costs, through 2040.250
SWIFT will help leverage state funding to generate $27 billion for
Texas water projects over fifty years while the 2017 State Water Plan
estimates a need for $62.6 billion in projects over roughly the same
period.251 Out of the $6.35 billion that FEMA provided to areas af-
fected by Hurricane Harvey between September 2017 and September
2018, only $43 million was categorized as funding for hazard mitiga-
tion.252 A kind interpretation is that hazard mitigation funding is not
well tracked at the state or federal level.253
Certainly, the $2.5 billion Harris County Flood Control Bond ap-
proved by voters on August 25, 2018, would qualify as hazard mitiga-
tion.254 While this funding is significant, the flood control
248. TIP vs. STIP: Definitions and Differences, TEX. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www
.txdot.gov/government/programs/stips/info/differences.html [https://perma.cc/UEW9-
P4KA] (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
249. See 2012 State Water Plan, supra note 114, at 21 (discussing funding available
for water planning and water projects); Transportation Funding in Texas, TEX. DEP’T
TRANSP. (2016–2017) https://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/fin/funding-sources.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QL6T-NX83] (describing funding for transportation).
250. Kevin McPherson et al., Transportation Infrastructure: Keeping Texas Moving,
TEX. COMPTROLLER (May 2018), https://comptroller.texas.gov/economy/fiscal-notes/
2018/may/transportation.php [https://perma.cc/7C7M-J332]; see Transportation Fund-
ing in Texas, supra note 249 (proving an overview of TXDOT spending and funding).
251. SWIFT Report, supra note 216, at 2, 7.
252. Brasier & Thompson, supra note 89, at 15.
253. Anne Stauffer, Justin Theal, & Colin Foard, Natural Disaster Spending Not
Comprehensively Tracked, PEW (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re-
search-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/09/natural-disaster-mitigation-spending—not-
comprehensively-tracked [https://perma.cc/4NNE-ZG6D].
254. 2018 HCFCD Bond Program, HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT,
https://www.hcfcd.org/2018-bond-program/ [https://perma.cc/VB7N-M742] (last vis-
ited Oct. 19, 2018); see also Zach Despart, Harris County Voters Pass $2.5 Billion
Flood Bond, HOUSTON CHRON., https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/
article/Harris-County-voters-pass-2-5-billion-flood-bond-13182853.php [https://perma
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infrastructure necessary to provide protection to every watershed in
Harris County to withstand twelve inches of rain in twenty-four hours
would cost an estimated $35 billion. Moreover, providing flood and
storm surge risk mitigation across the Houston region would cost an
additional $22.97 billion.255
The State of Texas can avoid great personal and economic losses by
improving hazard mitigation funding.256 Some funding may come
from GOMESA, port tonnage fees, and various federal programs, but
these funds will be spent in very specific locations or projects that
leave populations, such as those between LMI and cost-benefit ratio,
unprotected.257 The State of Texas may consider setting up credit facil-
ities like SWIFT or funding streams like Proposition 1 for Transporta-
tion that benefit hazard mitigation and disaster response.258
C. Requiring Character:  The Necessity and Challenge
of Fixing Flood Insurance
The National Flood Insurance Act was passed with the expectation
that the federal government would accurately model flood risk and
continue to fund flood mitigation infrastructure at 1968 levels.259 Both
expectations have proven to be disastrously wrong. For example, 53%
of the approximately 180,000 flood insurance claims filed in Texas af-
ter 2008 occurred outside of high-risk flood zones. FEMA estimates
that those claims represent $12.7 billion in damages. Despite the hur-
ricanes and floods in 2017 and the stories of people who flooded with-
out coverage, federal flood insurance policies increased only slightly
to 5.1 million by July 31, 2018, up from 4.94 million in 2017.260 Texans
obtained approximately 145,000, or over 90%, of those new policies,
but millions of Texans still lack flood insurance.261
.cc/9DWB-L6H2] (last updated Aug. 26, 2018) (reporting that the bond proposition
passed by over 85%).
255. See Our Plan, HOUSTON STRONGER (Mar. 16, 2018), http://houstonstronger
.net/resources/ [https://perma.cc/BYM8-PND2].
256. Brasier & Thompson, supra note 89, at 17.
257. See Gene Pawlik & Doug Garman, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Identifies
Long-Term Disaster Recovery Projects and Additional Short-Term Repairs to be Ac-
complished with 2018 Supplemental Funding, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, (July 5,
2018), https://www.usace.army.mil/Media/News-Releases/News-Release-Article-
View/Article/1567778/us-army-corps-of-engineers-identifies-long-term-disaster-recov
ery-projects-and/ [https://perma.cc/T6HK-2QVG]; see also HUD Awards $28 Billion
in CDBG-DR Funds, HUD EXCHANGE, (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.hudexchange.in
fo/news/hud-awards-28-billion-in-cdbg-dr-funds/ [https://perma.cc/6GSA-D3HS].
258. SWIFT Report, supra note 216, at 4; Transportation Funding in Texas, supra
note 249, at 3-4.
259. See Mendelson, supra note 54, at 1520.
260. Ken Sweet & Meghan Hoyer, Hurricane Florence Likely to Expose Gaps in
Flood Insurance, INS. J. (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
southeast/2018/09/17/501489.htm [https://perma.cc/P8FP-5MUK].
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NFIP makes government flood insurance widely available, avoida-
ble, and affordable, which incentivizes and subsidizes risky behavior
and places the ultimate costs of risky behavior on taxpayers.262 Other
flood insurance models from around world offer solutions to fix
NFIP’s shortcomings. The German model is private and does not re-
quire coverage, but flood insurance is very expensive unless the cov-
ered structure is built in a safe location and to high standards.263 The
United Kingdom has the opposite system of the United States—it is
private and unavoidable.264 The UK requires property owners to
purchase private insurance, which keeps premiums lower and stan-
dards high with little government intervention.265 The French model
appears similar to the British model, but it funds flood insurance and
perils risk through a surcharge on most private insurance policies to
provide a pool of capital.266
The French enacted their successful catastrophe insurance
surcharge in 1982, which applies to most insurance policies including
those for home, business, car, and other policies.267 The surcharge
funds disaster response and mitigation, meaning that individuals with
policies for their property and persons have coverage in the event of a
catastrophe.268 This surcharge model fixes the defects of NFIP be-
cause participation is universal, the collected surcharges have ex-
ceeded insurance expenses, and the program receives near universal
support.269
Privatizing residential flood insurance in the United States appears
unlikely, so the German and UK flood insurance models have little
application in Texas. Events like Hurricane Florence divert national
attention away from fixing NFIP.270 The State of Texas could adopt a
Texan approach to the French model by applying a variable surcharge
on insurance policies issued in Texas communities.271 The State could
apply higher surcharges on policies at higher-risk addresses unless the
policy purchaser can show proof of NFIP flood insurance, in which
case the purchaser avoids the surcharge.272 The collected revenues
could support flood mitigation efforts in proactive communities and
provide  Texas residents without flood insurance with assistance after
a disaster .
262. See Ivan Maddox, Flood Insurance Models Around the World, RISKS HAZARD
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D. Blocking the Effects of Disaster:  Block Grants Can Provide
Quicker Responses to Disaster
Testifying before Congress, Brock Long said, “FEMA should be a
block grant agency.”273 GLO endorsed this viewpoint and recom-
mended a FEMA block grant program for temporary housing that
would trigger purchase orders through contracts negotiated ahead of
storms. The GLO could also provide block grants that allow flood-
plain managers to buy houses in predetermined areas at pre-flood
market rates, plus relocation expenses, which would help flood victims
and taxpayers.
V. CONCLUSION:  HAZARD A GUESS
Over 215 years of federal policy have created an expectation of pa-
ternal care without a firm commitment to provide sturdier communi-
ties. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 provides  a framework to
incentivize responsible state and local action. Texas should improve
on the path taken by Florida and other states to become a leader in
hazard mitigation. Texas can borrow from effective parts of its trans-
portation and water planning and its funding frameworks to build
within FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Plan process. This approach will
help attract participation, increase funding, and promote coordination
of planning projects across varying levels of government. Hurricane
Harvey was an awful event, but if Texas takes the right action now, it
can show its citizens and the world that it is sturdier after the storm.
273. GEORGE P. BUSH, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., HURRICANE HARVEY: TEXAS AT
RISK 34 (2018), http://www.glo.texas.gov/recovery/files/texas-at-risk-report.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/U2DT-U48P].
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